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CASENOTE; In re Petition to Transfer Territory from Vaughn School 
District to Power School District: Leaning Heavily on the Principle of 
Substance over Form 
Luc Brodhead 
 As the final authority for interpreting Montana statutes, the 
Montana Supreme Court cannot make its interpretations lightly. To guide 
its hand, the Court relies on the principles of statutory interpretation and 
the codified notion that the “law respects form less than substance.”1 This 
principle enables the Court to excuse technical deficiencies in the name of 
judicial efficiency and justice when it determines that the deficiency does 
not implicate the substance of the statute. 
In In Re Petition to Transfer Territory From Vaughn Elementary 
School District to Power Elementary School District2, the Court invoked 
this principle to support its conclusion that a new elementary school had 
met the statutory opening requirements. The Court had to reach that 
conclusion to protect the school from a land grab by a neighboring school 
district. While the Court had good intentions, its reasoning did not fully 
support the conclusion that the elementary school met each requirement. 
Rather, the Court leaned heavily on the principle of substance over form 
to excuse deficiencies that stood in the way of a just result. Consequently, 
the Court turned a carefully applied judicial gloss into a powerful trump 
card: a simple phrase the Court can invoke when it wants to overlook the 
express words of the Legislature. 
 
I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
In February 2013, several members of the Hillcrest Hutterite 
Colony petitioned the Vaughn School District Board of Trustees to open a 
public elementary school in one of the colony facilities.3 The School 
District agreed to provide a full-time teacher, a teacher’s aid, teaching 
supplies, textbooks, and administrative support.4 The school, named the 
Hillcrest Attendance Center (Attendance Center), began welcoming 
students late summer of 2013.5 
 In November of 2013, Vaughn School District received a petition 
from Power School District to transfer a specific portion of its territory 
pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 20–6–105.6 Under that provision, the local 
electorate can petition to transfer territory among school districts as long 
                                           
1 MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–3–219 (2015). 
2 In Re Petition to Transfer Territory From Vaughn Elementary School Dist. to Power Elementary 
School Dist., 360 P.3d 1119 (Mont. 2015). 
3 Id. at 1120. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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as the statutory criteria for the territory are met.7 One such requirement is 
that the “territory to be transferred is not located within 3 miles, over the 
shortest practicable route, of an operating school in the district from which 
it is to be transferred.”8 
A panel of county superintendents was assembled to address the 
petition. Citing the above provision, the panel dismissed the transfer 
request because the Hillcrest Attendance Center was located within 3 
miles of the territory.9 The commissioners concluded that the Attendance 
Center is a school under the statutory definition and “operates as any 
public school in the state of Montana.”10 
 Power School District sought judicial review of the decision on 
the issue of whether the Attendance Center constituted a school for the 
purpose of limiting territory transfers.11 The district court affirmed, 
holding that “[i]n all respects, [the Attendance Center] is an operating 
school maintained under state law at public expense.”12 Power School 
District appealed the district court’s decision.13 
 
II.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
 
 On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the district court’s 
decision, holding that the Attendance center was a school under the 
statutory definition and thus affirmed the dismissal of the transfer 
request.14 To support its decision, the Court interpreted the statutory 
definition of an “operating school” under § 20–6–501 and found that, in 
substance, the Attendance Center met the standard despite statutory 
deficiencies in how the school was established.15 
 The Court acknowledged the statutory definition of a school as 
being “an institution for the teaching of children that is established and 
maintained under the laws of the state of Montana.”16 Having done so, it 
readily concluded that the Attendance Center met the requirement of being 
“an institution for the teaching of children,” pointing out that, under the 
agreement between Vaughn School District and the Hillcrest Colony, the 
Attendance Center would operate as a public school of the Vaughn School 
District, it would be provided with teachers and supplies, and it was 
required to meet all school district, state, and federal laws.17 
                                           
7 MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–6–105(1) (2015). 
8 Id. at (1)(a)(iii). 
9 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1120. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1122–23. 
15 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1122–23. 
16 Id. at 1121 (citing § 20–6–501). 
17 Id. at 1121–22. 
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The Court also addressed whether the Attendance Center met the 
requirement of being “established and maintained” under Montana law.18 
It did so in response to Power School District’s argument that the 
Attendance Center “was not opened consistent with the procedures set 
forth in § 20–6–502,” specifically that the opening lacked approval from 
the county commissioners.19 Reviewing the argument, the Court 
acknowledged that § 20–6–502 provides that a petition to open an 
elementary school must be presented “to the board of county 
commissioners for their consideration,” and that “the board may approve 
or disapprove the requested opening.”20 The Court acknowledged that the 
Vaughn School District Trustees somehow missed this step before 
opening the Attendance Center.21 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that 
the school still was “established . . . under the laws of the state of 
Montana.”22 
 To reach this conclusion, the Court invoked the principle of 
substance over form and held that, in substance, the school met the 
“established” element of the statutory definition.23 Despite lacking 
approval from the county commissioners, the school was still approved by 
“local school authorities,” and the facts of the case satisfied the substance 
of what it means to be “established . . . under the laws of the state of 
Montana.”24 The Court’s final conclusion articulated that to hold 
otherwise would “truly elevate form over substance.”25 
 
III.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT 
 
 Justice McKinnon dissented from the Court’s opinion, asserting 
that the Attendance Center should not have been considered a school and 
thus should not be funded, accredited, or protected from the land transfer.26 
She focused on how the Legislature “specifically provided” for a county 
commissioner’s approval before an elementary school can be opened, and 
she argued that to ignore this requirement would “be tantamount to 
disregarding the plain language of the statutory scheme and omitting 
language that the Legislature inserted.”27 
 She further justified her position, asserting that, not only did the 
Legislature unambiguously include the requirement, but that it had 
significant policy justification for doing so.28 She reasoned that it is the 
                                           
18 Id. at 1122. 
19 Id. 
20 MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–6–502(3). 
21 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1122. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 1122–23. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1122. 
26 Id. at 1126. 
27 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1123. 
28 Id. at 1123–24. 
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county commissioners who actually levy the required taxes to fund the 
opening of a new school and that they are the ones accountable to the 
taxpayers for the subsequent tax increases.29 She also pointed out that “the 
statutory scheme allows the county commissioners one substantive 
opportunity to exercise their power over the funding of a new school . . . 
and this comes at the time the school is established pursuant to § 20–6–
502.”30 
 McKinnon concluded that the Court overstepped its function by 
“fundamentally alter[ing]” the Legislature’s design for establishing 
schools, and she made the prediction that “local school trustees may now 
sidestep elected officials” during that process.31 She characterized the 
Court’s decision as “divest[ing] elected officials of power that has been 
properly granted to them by the Legislature.”32 
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
 McKinnon’s dissent explained the legal and policy reasons why 
school districts need to get approval from county commissioners before 
opening new schools. In doing so, she demonstrated the significance of the 
commissioner approval requirement to the overall scheme of regulating 
and funding of schools in Montana. Considering the significance of the 
commissioner approval requirement, it is concerning that the Court relied 
so heavily on the principle of substance over form to justify its decision. 
If the Court believes that enforcing an unambiguous and significant 
procedural step is to “elevate form over substance,” then what other 
statutory requirements will the Court overlook down the road?33 
 This analysis will address how the Court has applied the principle 
of substance over form in the past and how, in this case, the Court 
broadened the circumstances where it can gloss over statutory 
requirements without legitimate justification.  
 
A.  The Court Previously Applied the Concept of Substance over Form to 
Excuse Minor Statutory Deficiencies, but Limited Its Application to 
Those Deficiencies Determined Nonessential to the Substance of the 
Statute. 
 
In the past, the Court has occasionally disregarded formalistic 
deficiencies, especially in the area of county and municipal administration. 
Never taking the Legislature’s mandates lightly, the Court only did so so 
when it first carefully reasoned that the particular statutory requirement 
                                           
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1124. 
31 Id. at 1126. 
32 Id. 
33 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1122. 
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was formalistic or superficial. The Court’s reasoning would always 
address whether holding a party to the exact requirement, at the cost of 
entirely invalidating an otherwise legitimate process, would respect the 
substance of the statute. 
In order to reach these decisions, the Court applied the principle 
of substance over form. This principle is included in the Montana Code as 
a “maxim of jurisprudence,” and it provides that “the law respects form 
less than substance.”34 The code describes the purpose of these maxims is 
to “aid in [the] just application” of the other provisions of the code.35 
The Court applied the principle in two fairly recent cases where it 
interpreted statutes regulating county administrative procedure and found 
the alleged deficiencies insufficient to invalidate the overall process.36 In 
Yurczyk, the Court upheld the validity of proposed zoning regulations 
despite the lack of the word “resolution” in their title.37 The statute at issue 
required the submission of a “resolution,” and the opposing party argued 
that lack of that term in the title should void the regulations.38 The Court 
held voiding the regulations for a mere wording oversight would be to 
“elevate form over substance.”39 To reach its decision, the Court reasoned 
that in substance the procedural requirements of the statute were met 
because the critical mandate of the statute was not to title the document in 
a certain way but to ensure that any proposed zoning regulations go before 
the proper elected official before their adoption.40 
Likewise, in McKirdy, the Court upheld the validity of a single 
petition to transfer territory between two K–12 school districts despite the 
lack of a second separate petition for the elementary school portion of the 
territory transfer.41 The statute identified by the opposing party required 
two petitions to effectuate a transfer between K–12 school districts, a high 
school territory transfer petition accompanied by an elementary school 
territory transfer petition.42 The opposing party argued that a reasonable 
reading of the language, “accompanied by,” clearly indicates a 
requirement of two physically separate petitions.43 The Court held that, 
although the statute required one petition be accompanied by the other, it 
would be overly formalistic to require two separate documents when one 
petition clearly identifies the intent to transfer both high school and 
elementary school territory.44 The Court reasoned that a second petition 
                                           
34 MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–3–219. 
35 Id. at § 1–3–101. 
36 McKirdy v. Villeux, 19 P.3d 207 (Mont. 2000); Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Cnt’y, 83 P.3d 266 (Mont. 
2004). 
37 83 P.3d at 271. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 McKirdy, 19 P.3d 207 at 213. 
42 Id. at 210. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 212–13. 
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was nonessential to the substance of the statute because the single petition 
contained all the requisite information that would have otherwise been 
contained in the two petitions.45 
In both of these cases, the Court balanced its duty to respect the 
exact terms of a statute as Legislative mandate and its duty to respect form 
less than substance. The rules of statutory construction accommodate this 
balancing approach and illustrate the tension between form and substance 
that the Court faced. The rule provides that “in the construction of a statute, 
the office of the judge is simply to ascertain what is in terms or in 
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit 
what has been inserted.”46 The rule gives courts permission to choose to 
construe a statute based on its terms, its substance, or a combination of the 
two. 
In conducting its balancing in Mckirdy and Yurczyk, the Court 
demonstrated that before it can diminish the importance of a particular 
term, it must ascertain that doing so would not ignore the substance of the 
statute, or in effect, omit some specific purpose that the legislature 
intentionally inserted.47 Before coming to its conclusion in Yurczyk, the 
Court determined that, in substance, the statute required that proposed 
zoning regulations be reviewed by the board of country commissioners.48 
Only by making that determination could the Court safely diminish the 
importance of other aspects of the statute, like including the word 
“resolution” in the title of the proposal. Otherwise, the Court was at risk 
of using its power to override a legislative mandate placed in the code to 
serve a legitimate policy purpose. 
Likewise, in Mckirdy, the Court carefully established that the 
central purpose of the statute was to ensure that local residents signing the 
petition were aware that it implicated both elementary school and high 
school territory.49 Only once it established the substance of the petition 
requirement could the Court determine that to require two physical 
documents would be formalistic and would not actually align with the 
legislative mandate.50 
Both of these cases demonstrate a carefully reasoned approach of 
applying the principle of substance over form, and provide a useful 
contrast to what the Court did here. 
 
 
                                           
45 Id. at 213. 
46 MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–2–101 (emphasis added).  
47 Yurczyk, 83 P.3d at 271; Mckirdy, 19 P.3d at 211–13. 
48 Yurczyk, 83 P.3d at 271. 
49 Mckirdy, 19 P.3d at 212–13. 
50 Id. at 213. 
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B.   In This Case, The Court Broadened its Ability to Excuse Statutory 
Requirements under the Guise of Substance over Form, and it 
Established That It Could Do So Without Satisfactory Explanation. 
 
As discussed above, the Court has invoked the principle of 
substance over form in circumstances where the parties did their best to 
follow statutory requirements but failed to meet some unclear or 
insignificant step. In those situations, the Court took time to explain why 
the particular requirement did not serve the substance of the statute before 
it determined that punishing the party for its misstep would not serve 
justice. 
In contrast, the Court here utilized substance over form as a catch-
all justification for excusing statutory deficiencies in a situation where it 
wanted to produce a just result. The consequence of using substance over 
form in this manner is that it justifies repetition of the overbroad use of the 
principle in future controversies. In other words, it creates space for the 
Court to disregard particular statutory deficiencies that stand in the way of 
what the Court views as a just decision. Moreover, it allows the Court to 
do so without explaining exactly why a certain provision is excusable or 
insignificant to the statutory scheme and the Legislature’s policy goals. 
To avoid this kind of overbroad use of substance over form, the 
Court needed to address the significance of the county commissioner 
approval requirement. Had it acknowledged, as Justice McKinnon did, 
how county commissioner approval is important to a commissioner’s 
obligations to their taxpayers and represents an important step in financing 
the opening of schools, then the Court would have had to justify why that 
requirement could be excused. 
Rather, the Court offered no admission that the requirement has 
significance, nor did it offer a satisfactory explanation for why the 
requirement lacks significance. The Court’s only explanation is that 
county commissioners have no direct supervision over schools.51 That 
explanation is insufficient because it is not relevant to the tax policy 
behind the requirement, which is to give elected officials an opportunity 
to decide whether to increase taxes on their constituents. The Court 
claimed that because “local school authorities” approved the school’s 
opening, the substance of the statute’s requirements is met.52 This is also 
an insufficient explanation because the local school authorities referred to 
by the Court still lack the taxing power to actually raise the necessary 
funds. Neither of these explanations amount to a convincing argument that 
the requirement is formalistic, nor do they establish any criteria for when 
such a requirement would be part of the substance of the statute. This 
departure from what the Court did in McKirdy and Yurczyk, makes it that 
                                           
51 In Re Vaughn Elementary, 360 P.3d at 1122. 
52 Id. 
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much easier for the Court to conclude that Legislative mandates are 
satisfied, even when a plain reading of the statute would suggest otherwise. 
By failing to engage in a meaningful discussion of why the 
requirement was insignificant, the Court made it unclear what types of 
statutory procedural requirements it will deem formalistic and unnecessary 
in the future. The consequence of this lack of clarity is that school districts 
or other local administrative bodies now can only guess what rules the 
Court will enforce and what rules they can risk avoiding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
